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Abstract
In this Note, the constitutionality of the federal Medicaid citizenship provision and state citizenship provisions enacted pursuant thereto is addressed. The constitutionality of the state Medicaid citizenship provisions is examined under the equal protection standards applicable to undocumented children. The constitutionality of the citizenship provisions of Title XIX, and the federal
regulations adopted pursuant thereto, is examined. The constitutionality of the state citizenship
provisions under the Supremacy Clause is addressed. Finally, this Note examines the unique position of pregnant undocumented aliens and their citizen offspring.

UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS' RIGHT TO MEDICAID
AFTER PLYLER V. DOE
INTRODUCTION
2
In Plyler v. Doe,I the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute
authorizing local school districts to deny enrollment in their public
schools to undocumented alien children3 violated the Equal Protec-

1. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
2. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1982), Section 21.031
provides in pertinent part that:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens
and who are over the age of five years and under the age of of 21 years on the first
day of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the
Available School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally
admitted alien and who is over the age of five-years and not over the age of 21 years
on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be
permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in
which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the
time he applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall
admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are
either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five
and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or
his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school
district.
id.
3. The term "undocumented alien" is used herein in place of the term "illegal alien," to
refer to all aliens who cannot prove that they are legally in the United States, but who are not
under order of deportation. This includes, for example, "aliens who do not have actual
possession of proper entry papers due to loss or theft of their entry visa as well as aliens who
are eligible for permanent residence status but have not applied for this status." Note, Equal
Protectionfor Undocumented Aliens, 5 CHICANO L. REV. 29, 29 n. 1 (1982) (quoting Letter
from Mexican American Legal Defense Fund to Hon. Evelle J. Younger (Sept. 5, 1978))
[hereinafter cited as Note, Equal Protection]. The term "illegal alien" more aptly refers to
aliens who have entered the United States illegally and are under order of deportation. Id.
The Census Bureau has used the term "illegal alien" more broadly to refer to aliens who are
deportablebecause they violated the statutes regarding entry to the United States or because
they violated the terms of their admission after being admitted legally. The term encompasses, therefore, those who "entered without inspection," "visa abusers" or "overstayers,"
and "fraudulent entrants." Siegal, Passel & Robinson, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Preliminary Review of Existing Studies of the Number of Illegal Residents in the United States,
reprinted in SELECTEo READINGS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW 5, 5 n.1 (1980)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Census Report].
The former definition is preferable to that used by the Census Bureau because the
question of deportability is not resolved until a formal finding is made under federal immi-

84

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:83

tion Clause 4 of the fourteenth amendment. 5 Citing Supreme Court

precedent that recognized undocumented aliens' due process rights,
the Court reasoned that the fourteenth amendment was designed to

gration statutes. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Prior to such a
finding, an undocumented person may have defenses to expulsion under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. See Federation for Am. Imm. Reform (FAIR) v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp.
564, 573-74 n.12 (D.D.C. 1980). See generally Schey, What the Texas School Case Really
Means, 5 IMM. J. 3 (1982). In addition, an undocumented person may be residing in the
United States with the formal or inchoate permission of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). See Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947
(1977) (undocumented alien residing in the United States under "color of law" by virtue of
the fact that the INS had issued a formal letter to the effect that deportation procedures had
not been instituted for humanitarian reasons); St. Francis Hosp. v. D'Elia, 71 A.D.2d 110,
119-20, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1979) (undocumented alien residing in United States under "color
of law" after expiration of nonimmigrant visa while application for immigrant visa pending);
Papadopoulos v. Shang, 67 A.D.2d 84, 87, 414 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1979) (undocumented alien
residing in United States under "color of law" after denial of permanent residence application
while awaiting a ruling on deferred status). For the law regarding illegal entry, see Immigration and Nationality Act, § 1251, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1976). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) (definition of deportable alien); 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(deportation proceedings).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment guarantees that "[n]o
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Id.
5. See 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). The Plyler Court applied the intermediate level of
scrutiny to undocumented children, and indicated that for undocumented adults, the rational relation test would be appropriate. See 457 U.S. at 218-24. See also infra notes 76-86
and accompanying text. Some courts before Plyler recognized the equal protection rights of
undocumented aliens. See Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
954 (1976); United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Otherson, 480 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D. Cal. 1979); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v.
Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). But see Alonso v. California, 50 Cal.
App. 3d 242, 249 n.3, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536, 540 n.3 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976);
Bastas v. Board of Review, 155 N.J. Super. 312, 382 A.2d 923 (App. Div. 1978). Undocumented aliens have been recognized as having other legal rights. See Williams v. Williams,
328 F. Supp. 1380 (D.V.I. 1971) (access to divorce court); Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines,
17 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1936) (right to bring a negligence action); Commercial Standard
Fire & Marine Co. v. Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (right to receive
workmen's compensation benefits).
Legal aliens have been afforded equal protection of the law since Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Takahashi v. Fish & Came Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 n.7
(1947); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). Legal aliens are a suspect class in equal
protection analysis; statutes which burden them are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973). For a discussion of this test, see infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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guarantee equality under the law to all persons physically within
the territorial jurisdiction of a state.6
The principle of the Equal Protection Clause is that statutes
cannot create classifications affording different treatment to persons who are similarly situated. 7 The extent to which persons are
construed as being similarly situated varies with the level of scrutiny the Supreme Court applies to the classification in the statute at
issue.8 The significance of the Plyler decision, therefore, lies not so
much in the Court's recognition of undocumented aliens' right to
equal protection as in its application of a meaningful standard of
scrutiny to the classification in the Texas statute.
The Plyler Court did not apply the traditional "toothless scrutiny" associated with its review of economic and social welfare
legislation. 9 Instead, it applied the more recently contrived "intermediate level" of scrutiny.' 0 As a result, Plyler creates doubt as to
the constitutionality of numerous federal and state statutes that
condition eligibility for government assistance on citizenship or
legal status (citizenship provisions)," at least insofar as they affect
undocumented children. Such statutes presently exclude between

6. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (citing Shaughnessy v. Mezet, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (1886)).
The Plyler Court also cited Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976), stating that Mathews
"clearly held" that illegal aliens are protected by the fifth amendment from invidious
discrimination by the federal government. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210. The statement in Mathews
referred to by the Plyler Court was dictum, however, because Mathews upheld a residency
requirement over a due process claim by a legally resident alien. 426 U.S. at 87.
7. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216; Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949) (discussing classification under the
Equal Protection Clause).
8. Tigner, 310 U.S. at 147 (1940).
9. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. See also infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text
(discussing the standard of review in rational relation tests).
10. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Food Stamp and Food Distribution Program, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(f) (Supp. V
1981); Grants to States for Old-Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981);
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C., § 602(a)(33) (Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as AFDC]; Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as Medicaid]; Grants to States for Aid to the Blind,
42 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (1976); Grants to States for Aid to Permanently and Totally Disabled, 42
U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1976) [hereinafter cited as APTD]; Supplemental Social Security Income
for the Aged, Blind and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B) (1976).
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three and twelve million 2 undocumented persons from government
assistance programs that provide support to indigent citizens and

12. Estimates of the number of undocumented aliens present in the United States have
varied considerably due to the obvious difficulty in obtaining an accurate estimate. Alien
Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp 544, 575 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982);
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),
aff'd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). For estimates of the number of undocumented aliens in the United
States, see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-19 n.17 (citing Joint HearingsBefore the Senate Subcomm.
on Immigration and Refugee Policy and House Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and
International Law, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1981) (testimony of William French Smith,
Attorney General)) (three to six million); Hewlett, Coping with Illegal Immigrants, reprinted
in HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., Twenty-Second Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference 77 (Joint
Comm. Print May, 1982) (four to six million with an annual net inflow of 500,000); Census
Report, supra note 3, at 9 (below six million as of 1978). Such low estimates have been
criticized elsewhere as "practically snatched out of the air." Federation for Am. Imm.
Reform (FAIR) v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 567 n.6 (D.D.C. 1980). In 1980, the New
York Times reported the number at ten million with two million more arriving each year.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, at Al, cited in Note, Equal Protection, supra note 3, at 30 n.6.
See also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Christian Sci. Monitor,
May 21, 1982, at 22, col. 4) (twelve million present).
The presence of this substantial number of undocumented aliens in the United States is
due primarily to the availability of employment and the failure of the federal government to
enforce the immigration laws. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); The
Knowing Employment of Illegal Immigrants: Hearingson Employment Sanctions Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981) (statement of Malcolm Lovell, Jr., Under Secretary, U.S. Dep't of
Labor) ("[T]here is . . . universal consensus that this flow of aliens into the United States is
principally a labor market phenomenon ....
[I]llegal immigration is primarily a movement
of workers who are pushed out of their Third World countries and pulled into our labor
market by the strong disparities between the wages and employment opportunities.").
The employment available to undocumented aliens is frequently provided at low wages
and under substandard conditions by employers seeking to evade laws passed for the protection of the American worker. W. FOGEL, MEXICAN ILLEGAL ALIEN WORKERS IN THE UNITED
STATES 95 (1979). Abusive labor practices have been reported by a Congressional committee
conducting hearings on undocumented aliens:
Without employer sanctions, such employers have been free to hire illegals, to pay
them less than prevailing wages for long hours of work, to subject them to unsafe
working or housing conditions, and to fire them at will, sometimes by notifying INS
when their work was done and their paychecks were due.
Id. at 24. Former Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall stated that:
Undocumented workers are subject to blackmail of every conceivable sort. If they
complain to their employers about their paltry wages and their unsafe working
conditions, they run the risk of being turned into the Immigration Service. As a
result they live a kind of half-life. They live among us but they live in fear, outside
the protection of basic laws.
Wash. Star, Apr. 24, 1977, at A2, col. 3, quoted in Catz, Regulating the Employment of
IllegalAliens: De Canas and Section 2805, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 755 n.24 (1977). See
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documented aliens.' 3 Title XIX of the Social Security Act14 (Title
XIX or federal Medicaid statute) is among the most important of
these assistance programs because of the potentially catastrophic
effects of denying medical assistance to undocumented aliens.' 5
In this Note, the constitutionality of the federal Medicaid citizenship provision and state citizenship provisions enacted pursuant
thereto is addressed. In Part I, those provisions are set forth and
explained. 6 In Part II, the constitutionality of the state Medicaid
citizenship provisions r is examined under the equal protection standards applicable to undocumented children.' 8 In Part III, the constitutionality of the citizenship provisions of Title XIX, and the
federal regulations adopted pursuant thereto, is examined.' 9 The
constitutionality of the state citizenship provisions under the Supremacy Clause 20 is addressed in Part IV. 2 l Finally, Part V examines the unique position of pregnant undocumented aliens and their
22
citizen offspring.
This Note concludes that under the intermediate level of scrutiny applied to undocumented children in Plyler, state statutes that
exclude children from Medicaid eligibility on the basis of their
undocumented status are in violation of the Equal Protection

also Illegal Aliens: A Review of Hearings Conducted During the 92d Congress Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973); W.
Foc.EL, supra at 90-94 (1979) (citing North & Houstoun, The United States Labor Market: An
Exploratory Study (1975) (prepared for the Employment and Training Division, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Washington, D.C.)) (Although the average wage for illegal aliens in manufacturing approximates that prescribed by federal law, conditions under which undocumented
aliens work are "inexcusable by U.S. standards."); Buck, The New Sweatshops: A Penny for
Your Collar, reprinted in SELETErD READINGS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW 34-38
(1980) (describing an estimated 4500 New York garment factories in which undocumented
aliens work under conditions which violate minimum wage, overtime, child labor, and
health and safety laws), See generally Note, Chinatown Sweatshops: Wage Law Violations in
the Garment Industry, 8 U.C.D. L. REV. 63 (1978).
13. See, e.g., supra note 11.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396p (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
15. See infra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
17. For examples of state Medicaid citizenship provisions, see infra note 47.
18. See infra notes 48-157 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 158-86 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
21. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.

88

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:83

Clause. 23 Because the Constitution prohibits Congress from eliciting
state participation in a jointly-funded program that authorizes the
states to violate the Equal Protection Clause,2 4 the citizenship provision of Title XIX should not be construed as authorizing the
exclusion of undocumented children from Medicaid. 2 The state
statutes which exclude undocumented children, therefore, may also
be in violation of the Supremacy Clause because they exclude persons made eligible for receipt of benefits under Title XIX. 26 Finally,
regardless of the equal protection rights of undocumented aliens, a

pregnant undocumented alien should be able to qualify for assistance under the Medicaid statute to ensure that the equal protection
27
rights of her child, as a citizen of the United States, are protected.

I. ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE MEDICAID STATUTE
Title XIX of the Social Security Act 2 81 provides for allocation of
federal matching funds to state medical assistance programs that
have been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) .29 Approval is granted following a state's compliance with the requirements enumerated in Title XIX and the
federal regulations adopted pursuant thereto. 3 Assuming a state

23. See infra notes 48-157 and accompanying text.
24. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 641 (1969).
25. See infra notes 158-86 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13 9 6 -1396p (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
29. Id. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has been redesignated the
Department of Health and Human Services. 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (1978 & Supp. V 1981).
Participation in the Medicaid program is optional. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DATA ON THE MEDICAID PROGRAM:

ELIGIBILITY SERVICES, EXPENDITURES 2 (1978). All states, except Arizona, have Medicaid
programs, as do the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301
(1980); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 427 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Becker v.
Blum, 464 F. Supp. 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Becker v. Toia, 439 F. Supp. 324, 327
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Arthur C. Logan Mem. Hosp. v. Toia, 441 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (upon determining that a state is not complying with an approved Medicaid plan, the
Secretary may withold federal payments but cannot compel compliance); Vetter v. Poland,
72 A.D.2d 776, 421 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1979) (state bound by federal regulations in administering
Medicaid program; in case of conflict, federal regulations control).
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program has been approved by the Secretary, medical assistance is
available to persons who meet certain eligibility standards.
A. Eligibility Based on Need
Title XIX provides for certain mandatory medical care and
services to two groups of individuals, commonly known as the
"categorically needy."'" The first group 32 consists of people receiving assistance under Title IV's Aid to Families with Dependent
Children 33 or Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance, 34 or Title XVI, Supplemental Security Income for the
Aged, Blind and Disabled. 35 The second group is composed of
people the state has opted to cover, and who, though not actually
receiving cash assistance under a federal program, have income and
resources that are low enough to qualify for such assistance. 36 States
also have the option of providing coverage to other persons who
meet the following requirements: (1) qualification as categorically

31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The services that must be
provided to this group are: inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, other
laboratory and x-ray services, skilled nursing home services and home health care services for
individuals aged 21 or over, early and periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment for
individuals under 21, family planning services, physician's services (whether furnished in the
office, the patient's home, a hospital or elsewhere), and services furnished by a nursemidwife. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In addition, states may
provide other services at their option, including but not limited to drugs, eyeglasses, private
duty nursing, intermediate care facility services, inpatient psychiatric care for the aged and
persons under 21, physical therapy and dental care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(6)-(16), (18) (1976
& Supp. V 1981).
32. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1982).
33. 42 U.S.C. §8 601-615 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
34. 42 U.S.C. 88 670-676 (Supp. V 1981).
35. 42 U.S.C. 88 1381-1385 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This program was implemented on
January 1, 1974, replacing the Grants to States for Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206
(1976 & Supp. V 1981), Grants to States for Old-Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1976
& Supp. V 1981), and APTD, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) programs.
Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 303(a), (b), 86 Stat. 1484 (1972). These latter
programs are still operative in Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Id.
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1982). The second group of categorically needy includes, but is not limited to, those who are not receiving assistance under a cash
assistance program, but who meet the income and resources requirements of the state plan for
such benefits, those who would meet the income and resource requirements of the applicable
program if their work-related child care costs were paid from their earnings rather than by a
state agency, and those who would be eligible to receive aid under the applicable program if
the state plan coverage were as broad as allowed by federal law. Id.
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needy, except that their income and resources are not low enough,
and (2) insufficient income and resources to meet medical care
costs. 3 7 This group is commonly known as the "medically needy."
B. Eligibility Based on Citizenship
In addition to the above-mentioned eligibility requirements,
the federal Medicaid statute includes a citizenship provision.3 8 Under that provision, the Secretary may not approve any state plan
that imposes a residence requirement excluding residents of the
state or a citizenship requirement excluding citizens of the United
States. 3 The federal regulations accompanying this provision make
coverage of citizens and documented aliens mandatory. 40 They provide that a state Medicaid plan must provide Medicaid to otherwise
eligible residents of the United States who are either citizens or
aliens lawfully admitted to the United States or permanently residing in the United States under color of law. 4

37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(ii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Medical services provided to
this group need not be as extensive as those provided to the mandatory group, but must
include certain minimal services, such as ambulatory services for children under 18 and
individuals entitled to institutional services, and prenatal care and delivery services for
pregnant women. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(iii) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 31 for
mandatory services.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 1396a(b) provides that:
The Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in
subsection (a) of this section, except that he shall not approve any plan which
imposes, as a condition of eligibility for medical assistance under the plan(1) an age requirement of more than 65 years; or
(2) any residence requirement which excludes any individual who resides in the
State; or
(3) any citizenship requirement which excludes any citizen of the United States.
Id.
39. Id.
40. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.402, 436.402 (1982). Section 435.402 provides in full that:
The agency must provide Medicaid to otherwise eligible residents of the United
States who are(a) Citizens; or
(b) Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence or permanently residing
in the United States under color of law, including any alien who is lawfully present
in the United States under section 203(a)(7) or section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.
Id. § 435.402. Section 436.402 is identical and applies to eligibility in Guam, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands. Id. § 436.402.
41. Id. An undocumented alien is entitled to Medicaid coverage under the federal
regulations if he is found to be residing in the United States under "color of law." St. Francis

1984]

UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS AND MEDICAID

The present federal Medicaid statute and regulations do not by
their terms prevent a state from including undocumented aliens in
its Medicaid program. 42 However, the regulation which preceded
the present eligibility regulation articulated an intent to exclude
44
undocumented aliens from coverage, 43 and the present regulations
contain an express statement that no policy or substantive changes
were intended by the recodification. 45 Consequently, mandatory
Hosp. v. D'Elia, 71 A.D.2d 110, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1979); Papadopoulos v. Shang, 67
A.D.2d 84, 414 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1979). See Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1977) (undocumented alien residing in United States under color of law
entitled to AFDC benefits).
42. See supra notes 38, 40.
43. 45 C.F.R. § 248.50 (1974). As originally incorporated into the Code of Federal
Regulations, the Citizenship and Alienage provisions of the federal Medicaid regulations
specified that, as a condition of approval, a state plan may not exclude an otherwise eligible
citizen of the United States. 36 Fed. Reg. 3872 (1971). Subsequently, this section was
amended in order to implement the Supreme Court's directive in Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971), which held that states may not condition eligibility of resident aliens for
welfare benefits on a durational residency requirement. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 37
Fed. Reg. 11,977 (1972). The revision published in the first Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
provided that "[a] State plan under Title XIX of the Social Security Act may not exclude an
otherwise eligible individual on the basis that he is not a citizen, or because of his alien
status." Id. In response to comments received after the first Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
the second such Notice said that a state plan "must exclude any individual who is not lawfully
in this country." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 38 Fed. Reg. 16,911 (1973). As enacted, the
revision of section 248.50 explicitly adopted the language excluding undocumented aliens,
providing, in part:
A State plan under title XIX of the Social Security Act shall include an otherwise
eligible individual who is a resident of the United States but only if he is either (a) a
citizen or (b) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise
permanently residing in the United States under color of law . ...
45 C.F.R. § 248.50 (1974) (emphasis added). The preamble to section 248.50 provided in
part that:
Requiring inclusion of illegal aliens, or leaving the matter to State option would be
inconsistent with title III of Pub. L. 92-603, which establishes a Federal program of
Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI) that excludes
aliens not lawfully residing in this country. Accordingly, the regulations as proposed
on June 27, 1973, are hereby adopted.
38 Fed. Reg. 30,259 (1973).
45 C.F.R. § 248.50 (1974) was later recodified without alteration as 42 C.F.R. § 448.50
(1977) in order to bring together in a single chapter the three major programs of the Health
Care Financing Administration. 42 Fed. Reg. 52,827 (1977). 42 C.F.R. § 448.50 was the
immediate predecessor regulation to 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.402, 436.402 (1982).
44. 42 C.F.R §§ 435.402, 436.402 (1982).
45. 43 Fed. Reg. 45,176 (1978). See also Calkins v. Blum, 511 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 n.3
(N.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 675 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that no changes were intended by
the recodification).
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exclusion of undocumented aliens remains in the regulations despite
the change in language. 46 A number of states have enacted statutes
under Title XIX that expressly exclude undocumented aliens from
eligibility. 47 As a result of the Plyler ruling, the constitutionality of
these statutes is questionable.
II. APPLICATION OF PLYLER TO STATE
MEDICAID STATUTES
A. The Standards of Review
In determining the constitutionality of statutes challenged on
equal protection grounds, the Supreme Court has traditionally in-

46. At least one state court has so held. See Monmouth Med. Center v. Kwok, 183 N.J.
Super. 494, 444 A.2d 610 (App. Div. 1982).
47. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAW § 131-k (McKinney 1983), which provides in
pertinent part that:
1. Any inconsistent provisions of this chapter or other law notwithstanding, an
alien who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residenceor not otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law shall be ineligiblefor aid to
dependent children, home relief or medical assistance.
2. An otherwise eligible applicant or recipient who has been determined to be
ineligible for aid to dependent children, home relief or medical assistance because
he is an alien unlawfully residing in the United States or because he failed to furnish
evidence that he is lawfully residing in the United States shall be immediately
referred to the United States immigration and naturalization service, or the nearest
consulate of the country of the applicant or the recipient for such service to take
appropriate action or furnish assistance.
Id. (emphasis added). The California Medicaid [hereinafter cited as Medi-Cal] eligibility
provision, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14,005 (West Supp. 1984), provides, in pertinent part,
that: "The health care benefits and services specified in this chapter . . . shall be provided
under this chapter to any person who is a resident of this state and is made eligible by the
provisions of this article." Id. The California Attorney General has interpreted the above
section to authorize a county to provide nonemergency health care services under Medi-Cal
to an undocumented alien upon his certification, under penalty of perjury, that he is in the
country legally and is entitled to remain indefinitely, or that he is not under order of
deportation, or that he is married to a person not under order of deportation. 62 Op. Cal.
Att'y. Gen. 70, 76-77 (1979). However, a county may require, as a condition to providing
medical assistance under Medi-Cal, that all applicants complete Medi-Cal application forms.
Id. The county may refuse to provide nonemergency health care to persons who refuse to
provide necessary information, including address, personal identification, or a social security
number. Id. Although undocumented aliens may be able to provide this information, they
obviously could not certify to legality of presence without risk of criminal prosecution for
perjury. See id. Moreover, fear of deportation is usually sufficient to keep undocumented
aliens from seeking medical care, especially in counties that have instituted policies requiring
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voked one of two standards of review, commonly referred to as the
"rational relation test 48 and the "strict scrutiny test. '49 Under the
rational relation test, a challenged classification will be upheld so
long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 50 Thus,
in Gull, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis, 51 the Court
held that a statute requiring railroads to pay attorneys' fees in
certain suits denied the railroads equal protection. 52 The Court
explained that the statute could not satisfy the rational relation test
because it did not "rest upon some difference [between railroad
companies and other companies] which bears a reasonable and just
relation to the [purpose of the] act in respect to which the classification is proposed." 5 3 The Court noted that railroad companies could
be separately classified if a statute were based on a characteristic
that sets railroad companies apart from other companies, such as
54
the peculiar safety hazards presented by railroads.
In the early 1900's, the Supreme Court invalidated numerous
economic and social welfare statutes for failure to satisfy the rationality requirement of the Equal Protection Clause. 55 After 1937,
anyone seeking medical assistance who cannot prove legal status to be turned over to the INS.
See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
48. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 591 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence
Tribe, The Middle Tier, and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 525, 526 n.3 (1980).
49. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 591; L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (1978); Fox, supra note 48, at 526 n.4.
50. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
51. 165 U.S. 150 (1897), discussed in Leedes, The Rationality Requirement of the Equal
Protection Clause, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 639, 642 (1981).
52. Id. at 155.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 157-58.
55. See, e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928) (Kentucky
statute providing for mortgage recording fee and tax classifications violates equal protection);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 US. 536 (1927) (Texas statute precluding blacks from voting in
Democratic primary violates equal protection); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921)
(Arizona statute exempting former employees from injunctive restraint for tortious injuries to
the business of employers violates equal protection).
During the same period, the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause to examine
state statutes regulating economic and social life. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426
(1917) (Oregon statute regulating men's working hours in certain professions upheld); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (Oregon statute regulating women's working hours upheld);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (New York statute regulating bakers' hours violates
equal protection).
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however, the Court became highly deferential to Congress in the
socioeconomic sphere, upholding legislation under the rational rela56
tion test with virtually no review of equal protection guarantees.
Since that time, statutory classifications have typically been invali57
dated "only if no grounds [could] be conceived to justify them.1
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has indicated that the
pendulum may be swinging back to a more meaningful examination of statutory classifications under the rational relation test.5 8 In
Schweiker v. Wilson, 5 the Court examined a classification in a
welfare program that treated residents in public institutions differently depending on whether they received Medicaid funds.60 Although the Court upheld the classification, it stated that the scrutiny it applied was "not a toothless one." 6' 1 The Court relied on
legislative history indicating that Congress had an identifiable legislative purpose for enacting the classification. 62 Thus, the Court
applied a standard of review stricter than merely upholding the
63
statute on any conceivable basis, as it had done in prior cases.
The Supreme Court uses the strict scrutiny test when a challenged classification adversely affects a group of persons based on
what the Court considers "suspect" criteria. 4 The Court also ap-

56. This deference to the federal government in social welfare and economic legislation
gained momentum with the Supreme Court's approval of New Deal legislation. See, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Agricultural Adjustment Act); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act). Limited scrutiny of social welfare
and economic legislation reached a peak during the Warren era. See, e.g., Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
The post-1937 period also marked the Supreme Court's ietreat from the substantive use
of the due process clause. See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525 (1949) (state labor law upheld); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S.
144 (1938) (federal statute regulating milk products upheld); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (state minimum wage law upheld).
57. McDonald v. Board of Elections Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
58. For a discussion of this trend, see Leedes, supra note 51.
59. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
60. Id. at 224-25.
61. Id. at 234 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)). See also Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 439 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62. See Wilson, 450 U.S. at 235-37.
63. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
64. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). The Court has labeled the following as
suspect classifications: race, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
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plies strict scrutiny when the right infringed by a statutory classification is considered "fundamental" by the Court. 5 Under strict
scrutiny, such a classification will be invalidated unless the government demonstrates that it is necessary to promote a compelling state
interest. 6
During the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has developed an intermediate test. Under this standard of review, classifications are upheld if they are found to be substantially related to the
achievement of important government objectives.6 7 The Court has
applied intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on gender 8

U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); national origin, see Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); and alienage, see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For a discussion of the current status of
alienage classifications, see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
65. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216-17. Fundamental rights have been held to include the
following: freedom of association, see Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); the right to vote,
see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elects., 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 96 (1965); the right to interstate travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31
(1969); and the right to privacy in certain matters relating to one's personal life, see Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(freedom of choice in marital decisions); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(sterilization).
66. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627. See also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (Restrictions curtailing civil rights of a racial group are
"subject... to the most rigid scrutiny" but "[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify
their existence.").
67. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Supreme Court has also stated this
test as requiring that a classification be "substantially related to a legitimate state interest."
See Pickett v. Brown, 51 U.S.L.W. 4655, 4657 (U.S. June 6, 1983) (emphasis added); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court applies intermediate scrutiny to classifications which, while not based on suspect criteria, distinguish groups based on "sensitive"
criteria. See L. TRIBE, supra note 49, at 1090. This would explain the use of intermediate
scrutiny for classifications based on gender, since four out of nine justices have stated that
gender should be labeled a suspect criteria. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Classifications based on illegitimacy may also be described as somewhat sensitive because, in
the Supreme Court's words, such statutes are "contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."
See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
68. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(drinking age); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (armed service benefits); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (executors of estates).

96

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:83

and illegitimacy.6" In addition, since classifications based on
alienage are upheld more often than other suspect criteria, 70 it has
been suggested that the Supreme Court's examination of such statutes is based on an intermediate level of scrutiny. 71 It has also been
suggested that the Supreme Court applies an intermediate standard
of review to classifications that implicate rights which, while not
fundamental, are considered by the Court to be of special importance. 72 These includes the ability to receive subsistence benefits in
the form of food stamps, 73 the right to obtain employment in a
major section of the economy,74 and the right to obtain higher
75
education at an affordable tuition.
B. Application of the Intermediate Test to Medicaid for
Undocumented Children
In Plyler, the Supreme Court did not apply strict scrutiny,
stating that undocumented children are not a suspect class 7 6 and
education is not a fundamental right. 77 Instead, the Court applied
69. See Pickett v. Brown, 51 U.S.L.W. 4655 (U.S. June 6, 1983) (statute of limitations
for support actions); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (same); United States v. Clark,
445 U.S. 23 (1980) (survivor's benefits); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (inheritance);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (inheritance); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976) (insurance benefits); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (disability benefits);
New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (financial assistance); Gomez
v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (child support); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(wrongful death actions).
70. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 592.
71. See L. TIBE, supra note 49, at 1052-56. See also Fox, supra note 48, at 532. While
it has been asserted by Justice Rehnquist that the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to
alienage classifications, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 780-81 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
there is some disagreement in the Court as to whether every alienage classification is subject
to strict scrutiny. Compare Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 19-24 (1982) (Blackmun J., concurring) (that aliens may be constitutionally denied political rights is an exception to the general
strict scrutiny standard applicable to classifications based on alienage) with id. at 38-42
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Supreme Court cases upholding statutes excluding aliens from
political rights indicates the demise of aliens as a suspect class). See also CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 48, at 686-88 (defining three categories of alienage cases, each subject to a
different standard of review).
72. See L. TRIBE, supra note 49, at 1090.
73. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
74. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 8A, 102-03 (1976).
75. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
76. 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
77. Id. at 221.
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the intermediate test and held that the classification excluding undocumented children from public education could not be considered rational "unless it further[ed] some substantial goal of the
State. "78
In justifying its application of intermediate scrutiny, the Court
noted that education is a benefit of special importance because of its
"pivotal role" in sustaining our democratic heritage. 79 The Court
stated that education is not "merely some governmental 'benefit'
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation."8 0
The Plyler Court also relied on the fact that the Texas statute
imposed its discriminatory burden on children based upon their
undocumented status, a legal characteristic over which they have
no control. 8 ' In view of the Supreme Court's application of the
intermediate test to gender and illegitimacy classifications, it may
be argued that intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications which
are based on the "status of birth" of the group affected. 82 Since
undocumented status is not truly a status of birth, depending as it
does on the child's illegal presence in the country, the Plyler Court
may have chosen to rely on the particular combination of education
and undocumented status in order to strike the Texas statute under
83
the intermediate test.
The Plyler Court, however, relied heavily on the rationale of
its illegitimacy decisions.8 4 The Court quoted its decision in Weber

78. Id. at 224. Unlike undocumented children, undocumented adults are present in the
United States as a reslt of their own unlawful conduct. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219. Therefore,
citizenship provisions in state Medicaid statutes, as applied to undocumented adults, would
probably be examined by the Supreme Court under the rational relation test. Under the
limited scrutiny given to statutes in the area of social welfare and economic legislation, see
supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text, it is likely that the Court would find that withholding medical assistance from undocumented adults is rationally related to a state's interest
in preserving the fiscal integrity of its Medicaid program. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 221.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 220.
82. See id. at 246 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Soberal-Perez v. Schweiker, 549 F. Supp.
1164, 1173 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), afJ'd, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983).
83. See 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977) (Illinois statute distinguishing
between legitimate and illegitimate children for purposes of intestate succession); Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (statute distinguishing between
legitimate and illegitimate children for purposes of workmen's compensation). See also Lalli
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v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,85 stating that " 'imposing disabilities on the. . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for
his birth and penalizing the . . . child is an ineffectual-as well as
an unjust-way of deterring the parent.' -86 Arguably, the common
element relied upon in Plyler was the culpability of the affected
group. If the Supreme Court remains faithful to this reasoning,
intermediate scrutiny would seem to be appropriate for all classifications that burden undocumented children, since they are not
responsible for their undocumented status.
If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court were to rely on the
combination of undocumented status and the benefit at issue, the
Court will have "opened the door to the creation of a hierarchy of
government benefits with the level of scrutiny varying depending
on the importance of the benefit. 8 7 The inadvisability of such a
ranking has been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in at
least one case. 88 In other cases, the Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized its limited judicial review by applying the rational relation test to uphold classifications relating to welfare 89 and public
housing. 0 In these cases, the Court found no basis for applying
strict scrutiny to statutory classifications which did not affect fundamental constitutional rights or employ suspect criteria. 9' Howv. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (intestacy statute distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate children for purposes of intestate succession).
85. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
86. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175).
87. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court stated that by attempting to rank the importance of the interests affected by a
statute for the purpose of determining what level of scrutiny to apply, the Court "would have
gone 'far toward making this Court a "super-legislature." ' [The Court] would, indeed, then
be assuming a legislative role and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competency." Id. at 31 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
The Rodriguez Court further stated that its power was limited to recognizing fundamental rights which are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33-34.
89. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams,.397 U.S. 471
(1970). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dandridge, took the position that the rational relation
test, while well-suited to economic regulation, should not be applied to the interests of the
poor in basic subsistence. 397 U.S. at 517-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
91. See Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 535; James, 402 U.S. at 137; Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 471.
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ever, there is ample evidence that the Court regularly employs 92
some
ranking system with respect to benefits conferred by statutes.
In determining whether the Supreme Court would apply the
intermediate standard of review to undocumented children in the
case of state Medicaid statutes, it is worth noting that, in a prior
case, the Court espoused the view that medical care is a "basic
necessity of life"9 3 and quoted from a lower court case which recognized that higher education is less important in comparison. 94 If the
Court did choose to rank the importance of medical care, it should
arguably apply the intermediate test to state Medicaid statutes
5
because of the relative importance of medical care.1
State interests which may be proffered to justify the exclusion
of undocumented children from Medicaid include preservation of
the fiscal integrity of the state Medicaid program, deterrence of an
influx of undocumented aliens into the United States, deterrence of
undocumented aliens from immigrating to a particular state to
utilize Medicaid services, and protection of residents who have
contributed to the community by payment of taxes. It is submitted
that none of these state interests withstand intermediate scrutiny.
1. Preservationof the Fiscal Integrity of the
State Medicaid Program
The Supreme Court has recognized that states have an interest
in limiting their expenditures to preserve the fiscal integrity of their

92. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. See also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at
458-59 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Justice White observed:
[I]t is clear that we employ not just one, or two, but, as my Brother Marshall has so
ably demonstrated, a "spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly
violative of the Equal Protection Clause." . . . [I]t
must now be obvious, or has
been all along, that, as the Court's assessment of the weight and value of the
individual interest escalates, the less likely it is that mere administrative convenience
and avoidance of hearings or investigations will be sufficient to justify what otherwise would appear to be irrational discriminations.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
93. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974).
94. Id. at 260 n.15 (quoting Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn.
1970), af'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (quoting with approval Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 430, 440, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554
(1970))).
95. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.

100

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:83

assistance programs. 96 Under the intermediate test, however, a
state cannot accomplish this purpose by distinguishing between
persons whose cost to the assistance program is similar. 97 In Plyler,
for example, the Court held that Texas could not justify the exclusion of undocumented children from its schools by showing that
barring a certain number of children would improve the quality of
education. 8 The state was required to justify the classification by
demonstrating that undocumented children were the appropriate
target for exclusion." An arbitrary choice was impermissible; undocumented children had to be distinguishable from citizens and
documented alien children in terms of educational cost and need.10 0
The Plyler Court found that because a child's illegal status did not
affect the cost of education, it was not an appropriate classification
for the purpose of saving cost.' 0 '
In his dissent in Plyler, Chief Justice Burger argued that since a
state has a legitimate interest in preserving its fiscal resources, it is
rational for a state to exclude persons illegally present from eligibility for benefits the state provides to those who are lawfully
present.102 Since he agreed that undocumented aliens are entitled to
equal protection, 0 3 the Chief Justice was taking issue with the
04
Court's decision to apply the intermediate standard of review.1
Under the rational relation test, less of a "rational relation" is
necessary between the statutory classification and the state interest.10 5 Since the Supreme Court has typically held classifications
invalid under the rational relation test only if they were "based on
reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit" of legitimate state inter-

96. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
97. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 229.
102. Id. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice was joined in dissent by
Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Id. at 242.
103. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger stated: "I have no
quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically 'within
the jurisdiction' of a state." Id.
104. See id. at 248.
105. See supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
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ests,1 06 Chief Justice Burger's contention was that the state's interest
in saving money was alone sufficient to justify the classification
07
under the rational relation test. 1
It is submitted, however, that the same state interest proffered
to justify state Medicaid statutes would not satisfy the intermediate
test. Undocumented aliens as a group may represent a greater cost
to the Medicaid program than many citizens and documented aliens. However, it is unclear to what extent the conditions under
which such persons live makes them distinguishable, in terms of
cost to the program, from citizens and documented aliens who are
also indigent and live under substandard conditions. Citizenship
provisions justified on the ground of saving Medicaid funds are
arguably "underinclusive."' ' 08 By excluding too many people who
are similarly situated in terms of the purpose of the law, the classification fails to adequately describe the group the state is attempting
to target. 109
Moreover, providing indigent undocumented aliens with the
means of detecting communicable diseases early has been shown to
be cost-effective as a means of reducing the incidence of communi0 Consequently, it is likely to result
cable disease community-wide. 11
in a decreased use of Medicaid by eligible citizens and documented
aliens. In 1977, Orange County, California, instituted a policy that
required indigents to apply for Medicaid before being treated."'
Anyone who refused to apply or could not prove legal status was to
be reported to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 112 Undocumented aliens were sufficiently frightened of deportation to

106. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (emphasis
added). See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
107. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

108. For a discussion of the concept of underinclusiveness, see

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

supra note 48, at 588-89.
109. Id.
110. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
111. Dallek, Health Care for Undocumented Immigrants: A Story of Neglect, 14
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 407, 413 (1980).
112. Id. The rationale behind such policies is to discourage undocumented aliens from
seeking services for which the state is not reimbursed by the federal government. Health and
the Environment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1981) (statement of
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, discussing similar policy in Los Angeles County)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Health].
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stay away from outpatient clinics. Within eighteen months, the
county experienced a 57 % increase in extrapulmonary tuberculosis,
a 47 % increase in salmonellosis, a 14 % increase in infectious hepa3
titis, a 53% increase in rubella and a 153% increase in syphillis."
Other studies have confirmed the view that when undocumented
aliens do not receive proper health care, the risk of communicable
disease is greater for all persons." 4 Since the danger is not limited to
those without Medicaid coverage, it is logical that the exclusion of
undocumented aliens from Medicaid coverage results in increased
use of Medicaid by those among whom undocumented aliens live
15
and work.
If a court found that excluding undocumented children from
Medicaid coverage did substantially further a state's interest in

113. Id. at 258 (statement of John E. Huerta, Associate Counsel, Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund). A commission that studied this policy stated the
problem as follows:
When poverty dominates one's life, a chronic cough could mean tuberculosis; a
series of intestinal symptoms may mean shigella or salmonella. When recourse to
proper medical services is made difficult or even curtailed, either on account of the
undocumented immigrant's fear of deportation or by reason of public policy excluding them from service, the undocumented person tends to let the matter lie. Understandably, conditions will only get worse, possibly requiring the emergency services
that the county by contract must provide without question. Hence, what was a
simple condition requiring relatively small expense becomes a large matter adversely
affecting all taxpayers.
Report on the Task Force on Public General Hospitals of the American Public Health
Association, The Economic Impact of Undocumented Immigrants on Public Health Services
in Orange County 57 (1978), quoted in Dallek, supra note 111, at 413.
114. See, e.g., Medical Treatment of Illegal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1977) (statement of Jim Bates, Chairman, San Diego County Bd. of
Supervisors) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Medical Treatment]. Moreover, a statement
prepared on behalf of the Los Angeles County Health Alliance revealed that treating undocumented aliens solely for communicable diseases would not alleviate the problem:
Nominally exempting communicable disease treatment from the requirement of
Medi-Cal application will not save this county from epidemics. Many contagious
tuberculosis sufferers, for example, do not recognize their chronic coughs as a
symptom of communicable disease, but continue to live and work side by side with
the rest of us. Their TB would only be detected and treated in the course of their
seeking non-emergency care for some other ailment. The American Lung Association has estimated that 300 cases per year of contagious tuberculosis will go undetected and be allowed to spread throughout this county as a result of the Board's
prospective policy.
Hearingson Health, supro note 112, at 254 (emphasis added).
115. See Hearings on Health, supra note 112.
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preserving its Medicaid funds, it could still find that this interest is
undercut by a corresponding increase in cost at the local level.
Local governments often must by law provide emergency care to all
persons, including undocumented aliens. "HThey thus bear the burden of treating undocumented aliens for emergency conditions
which arise as a result of the lack of treatment at earlier stages of
illness. For example, in 1980, the Bexar County Hospital District in
San Antonio, Texas, increased the cost of a clinic visit for out-ofcounty residents. 1 7 Within one month there was a 44% decline in
outpatient visits," 8 and later a 21.3 % increase in emergency room
visits.' 9 Emergency room care was two to three times more expensive than outpatient care. 120 Similarly, a 1971 Medicaid co-payment
experiment in California that imposed a one dollar charge on certain Medicaid beneficiaries for the first two visits to a doctor resulted in a significant decrease in physician utilization, including
selected preventive and diagnostic services.' 2 ' A study of the program demonstrated its cost-ineffectiveness: the result was an additional cost to California of U.S.$1,228,150.1 22 These findings have
23
been confirmed by studies of similar policies instituted elsewhere.

116. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b (McKinney 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §
17-5-61 (1953).
117. Dallek & Parks, Cost-Sharing Revisited: Limiting Medical Care to the Poor, 14
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1149, 1151 (1981).
118. Id. (citing San Antonio Express, Apr. 5, 1980).
119. Id. at 1151-52.
120. Id. at 1152.
121. Id. at 1151. Pap smears and urinalyses were among the services most often sacrificed. Id.
122. Id. at 1151-52 (citing Roemer, Hopkins, Carr & Gartside, Copaymentsfor Ambulatory Care: Pennywise and Pound Foolish, 13 MED. CARE 466 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Roehmer, Hopkins]. See also Helms, Newhouse & Phelps, Copayments and the Demandfor
Medical Care: The CaliforniaExperience, 9 BELL J. ECON. 192-208 (1978), cited in Dallek &
Parks, supra note 117, at 1152 (confirming findings of Roehme, Hopkins, supra).
123. See Chavkin, FloridaMedicaid Reform: Less Is Not Always Cheaper, 14 CLEnRINGHOUSE REV. 324, 325 (1980) (citing FLORIDA DE'T OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SlRVS.,
MEDICAID REFORM: A COMMITMENT TO BETrR

HEALTH CARE IN THE 8o'S FOR FLORIDA'S NEEDY)

(Florida law excluding most preventive care from Medicaid coverage resulted in delayed
treatment ultimately requiring expensive institutional or emergency care). See also Dallek,
supra note 11, at 413 (citing Los ANGELES COUNTY DEP'T OF HEALTH SERvs., DRAFr REPORT
TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 12 (1978)) (reporting on a study of the effects of denying certain
health services to undocumented immigrants in Los Angeles County), stating that:
[T]here are few alternative sources of care available to these people. A survey of 120
private hospitals in this area . . . identified only seven hospitals which indicated
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In order to avoid this unnecessary cost and health risk, many counties have extended some health services to the public on an almost
no-questions-asked basis. 24 The result is that the entire burden of
125
undocumented aliens' health care is placed on local governments.
In sum, since the costs of excluding undocumented aliens from
Medicaid coverage seem to outweigh the savings, citizenship provisions should not be found to be substantially related to this state
interest.
2. Deterrenceof an Influx of Undocumented Aliens
into the United States
The power to control immigration is exclusively a federal concern. 12 Consequently, a state cannot ordinarily use this ground to
justify a statute that burdens aliens. 2 7 However, in Plyler, the
Supreme Court held that a state may constitutionally attempt to
deter unlawful immigration if a "traditional state concern" is implicated. 28 The Court cited two examples of traditional state concerns
that justify intrusion into the historically federal area of deterring
immigration: (i) impairment of the state's economy and (ii) impairment of the state's ability to provide some important service. 29
The Plyler Court found that illegal entrants posed no threat to
either of these state concerns. 30 Rejecting the assertion that undocumented aliens are a significant burden on the state's economy, the
Court found that, to the contrary, undocumented aliens underutiability to accept additional patients who were undocumented aliens without insurance or clear ability to pay. In short, many of the patientswill get sicker, and some

of those will need later emergency care (which the county must by law provide).
Others will die or will be unable to function effectively.
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the Supreme Court in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250 (1974), rejected the state of Arizona's attempt to justify a durational residency
requirement for receipt of Medicaid benefits on the grounds of fiscal savings, stating that "the
County's claimed fiscal savings may well be illusory. The lack of timely medical care could
cause a patient's condition to deteriorate to a point where more expensive emergency hospitalization (for which no durational residency requirement applies) is needed." Id. at 265.

124. Hearings on Medical Treatment, supra note 114, at 72.
125. See id.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976). See also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228.
See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263-64 (1974).
457 U.S. at 228 n.23.

Id.
Id. at 228.
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lize public services while they contribute their labor and taxes to the
economy.' 3' In addition, although the Court did not define what it
meant by "important services,' 32 it did find that undocumented
children did not impair the state's ability to provide high quality
education because "in terms of educational cost and need [they are]
'basically indistinguishable' from legally resident alien children. ' 1' 33
Similarly, as the statistics previously cited demonstrate, providing
Medicaid benefits to undocumented aliens does not impair the
state's ability to provide that service. 134 Therefore, under the reasoning of Plyler, a state has no legitimate interest in deterring
immigration by excluding undocumented children from Medicaid.
Moreover, even assuming a legitimate state interest in deter-

ring unlawful immigration, it is submitted that excluding undocumented children from Medicaid is not substantially related to that
state interest. In Plyler, the Court stated that charging tuition was a

" 'ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immi-

gration,' ,135 because "[v]irtually all of the undocumented persons
who come to this country seek employment opportunities,' 36

131. Id. (citing Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 570-71 (S.D. Tex. 1980),

aff'd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982; Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578 (E.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 628
F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), afJ''d, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)). Such findings have been confirmed by
more recent studies. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
132. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 n.23.
133. Id. at 229 (quoting Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. at 583 & n.104; Doe
v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 589).
134. See supra notes 96-125 and accompanying text.
135. 457 U.S. at 228 (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 585). See also Harrell v.
Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22, 29 n.12 (D.D.C. 1967) (quoting Kasius, What Happens in a State
Without Residence Requirements, in Residence Laws: Road Block to Human Welfare 19-20
(1956)) (finding that protecting the state against an influx of people seeking public welfare is
not rationally related to a residency requirement because " 'to assume that people are
influenced to move or not to move according to the availability of help on a relief basis is to
misunderstand the dynamics of human behavior.' "). See also Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F.
Supp. 65, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (proof that deletion of residence requirement for receipt of
public welfare would not result in an influx of destitute relief seekers was accepted by both
sides).
136. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 n.24 (citing Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 460-61 (5th Cir.
1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)). See also Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. at 578;
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 585. The District Court in Doe v. Plyler stated that "the
undisputed testimony to this effect at trial is supported by every source this court has
consulted." Id. at 578 n.ll (citing Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal
Preemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977)).
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rather than education. Similarly, in light of the finding that virtually no undocumented aliens seeking entry into a state are motivated by the availability of government benefits, withholding medical assistance cannot substantially further the avowed purpose of
deterring immigration.
3. Deterrence of Undocumented Aliens From Immigrating to a
State to Utilize Medicaid Services
State citizenship provisions enacted for the purpose of deterring undocumented aliens from immigrating to a state solely to gain
access to Medicaid are arguably unconstitutionally "overinclusive.' 37 An overinclusive distinction fails to adequately describe the
target group that the state is attempting to distinguish by drawing
within its scope too many unintended individuals. 3 8 Statutes need
not be perfectly drawn to exclude only those persons whose exclusion furthers the state purpose. 39 However, in cases in which the
Supreme Court has utilized the intermediate level of scrutiny to
examine overinclusive state statutes, it has required the states to
consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of
complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of applicability. 1 40 In Trimble v. Gordon,'4 ' the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of an Illinois statute prohibiting illegitimate children from taking from their fathers by intestate descent. 42 The
Court struck down the statute on the ground that it was too broadly
drawn, excluding illegitimate children whose inheritance rights
could be recognized without jeopardy to the state's interest in the
orderly settlement of estates. '43 In the Court's words: "Difficulties
of proving paternity in some situations do not justify the total
statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die
intestate . . . . The reach of the statute extends well beyond the

137. For a discussion of the concept of "overinclusiveness," see CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 48, at 589.
138. Id.at 588.
139. Id.
140. See United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 31 (1980); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 770-71 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974).
141. 430 U.S. 762 (19"77).
142. Id.at 763.
143. Id. at 770-71.
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asserted purposes. "' 44 Similarly, in Jimenez v. Weinberger,145 the
'6
Court struck down a provision of the federal Social Security Act 6
that limited illegitimate children's eligibility for disability benefits. 147 The Court stated that while the prevention of fraud is a
legitimate goal, it does not necessarily follow "that the blanket and
conclusive exclusion of [the affected] subclass of illegitimates is
reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims. "148
Applying this reasoning to the exclusion of undocumented children from Medicaid, it appears that the citizenship provisions are
similarly overinclusive. "Virtually all" undocumented aliens come
to the United States for employment.149 Presumptions about the
motivation of a few others do not justify a total statutory exclusion
of undocumented children for the purpose of deterring immigration. "The reach of the statute extends well beyond the asserted
purposes. "150
4. Protection of Residents Who Have Contributed to the
Community by Payment of Taxes
States have defended durational residency requirements for
receipt of welfare and medical services on the ground that such
services are made available by the past tax contributions of residents and that they should not have to "share" these limited re5
sources with new residents.' 1
The Supreme Court has stated that the preferential treatment
of long-time residents because of their past tax contributions to the
community is an impermissible state objective under the Constitution as a burden on the fundamental right to interstate travel. 5 2 It

144. Id. at 772-73.
145. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(B) (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(B)
(1976)).
147. Id.
148. 417 U.S. at 636. See also United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 31 (1980).
149. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 n.24 (citing Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 460-61 (5th Cir.
1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
150. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772-73.
151. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 266 (1974) (health care);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969) (welfare). See also Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 450 n.6 (1973) (tuition rates for in-state versus out-of-state students).
152. Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 266; Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 450 n.6; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 632-
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is unclear whether undocumented aliens have a constitutional right
to interstate travel. 5 3 If they do not, citizenship provisions which
exclude undocumented children on this ground would not be subject to strict scrutiny because they do not burden any fundamental
right. However, even under intermediate scrutiny, this state interest appears insufficient. Most undocumented aliens do pay a significant share of total tax revenue. One recent study has confirmed that
undocumented aliens contribute more to a state's coffers in taxes
than they take out in services. 5

4

The study found that in 1982, the

state of Texas and six major localities took in at least U.S.
$162,000,000 from undocumented aliens while spending at most
U.S.$132,000,000 on them for services.15 5 And, as the district court
5 noted in reference to undocumented aliens, "it is
in Doe v. Plyler"'
impossible to live in a state such as Texas without paying consumer
taxes, and nearly impossible to work without paying Social Security

153. There have been recurring differences within the Supreme Court as to the source of
the right to interstate travel. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966). The Supreme
Court has stated that the origin of the right may be "within the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or within the term liberty in the due process clause."
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 163 (1941). Justice Douglas has expressed the view that
the "right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship protected by
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 178 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). If the right to interstate travel derives from the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, undocumented aliens have no claim to that right because that provision protects
citizens of the federal government. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 52-53
(1873). If, on the other hand, its source is the Due Process Clause, undocumented aliens may
fall within its protection. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (reaffirming the
Supreme Court's recognition of undocumented aliens' due process rights). The Court has
stated, however, that the right to interstate travel "is quite independent of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Guest, 383 U.S. at 759-60 n.17.
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions recognized the unconstitutionality of
durational residency requirements as a burden on the right to interstate travel. In one such
case, the Court recognized that undocumented children may be subject to a bona fide
residency requirement as a condition to their admission to public school, and in the same
discussion reiterated the unconstitutionality of durational residency requirements. Martinez
v. Bynum, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 1841-42 (1983). The Court may have been implying that durational resident requirements would also be unconstitutional as to undocumented children,
and that they enjoy the right to interstate travel.
154. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at A17, col. 1.
155. Id.
156. 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1979), af'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457
U.S. 202 (1982).
157. Id. at 578.
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taxes."'1 57 Consequently, there appears to be no rational basis for
distinguishing between undocumented aliens and other residents.
III. APPLICATION OF PLYLER TO THE FEDERAL
MEDICAID STATUTE
A. The Citizenship Provision of Title XIX
Congress' broad power to legislate with regard to aliens stems
from the constitutional provision allowing Congress to govern the
entry and conduct of aliens.158 The Supreme Court has recognized
that the judiciary must exercise deference when it reviews federal
legislation that affects aliens. 1 59 However, Congressional power to
legislate in this area is not without limitation. 160 Where a jointlyfunded assistance program is involved, Congress is not empowered
to authorize the states to violate the Equal Protection Clause.' 6'
62
In Graham v. Richardson,1
the Supreme Court ruled on the
6
3
constitutionality of Arizona and Pennsylvania' 64 statutes that im158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall
have Power . ..[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." Id.
159. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (federal immigration act provision excluding
illegal alien child and natural father from special immigration status held constitutional by
reason of the political character of alien legislation); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)
(federal legislation classifying aliens for receipt of welfare benefits constitutionally permissible under federal government's broad power over immigration and naturalization); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state statute barring issuance of
commercial fishing licenses to certain resident aliens preempted by federal government's
broad constitutional power over what aliens shall be admitted, the period they may remain,
regulation of their conduct before naturalization and the terms and conditions of theif
naturalization); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state alien registration statute
preempted by federal legislation enacted under the Immigration and Naturalization power);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (state statute excluding aliens from private employment
preempted by federal power to control immigration). But see Hines, 312 U.S. at 76 (1940)
(Stone, J., dissenting) (federal government's acts with respect to aliens must be in pursuance
of a constitutionally granted power, not a general police power over aliens lawfully admitted).
160. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971).
161. Graham, 403 U.S. at 382. See Ulso Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969)
(Congress is without the power to authorize a state statute governing receipt of AFDC
benefits that violates the equal protection rights of new residents); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (Congress's power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment does not permit Congress to enact a voter registration statute violating the equal
protection rights of citizens).
162. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
163. Amz. REV. STAT ANN. § 46-233 (Supp. 1970-71) (amended 1972).
164. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432(2) (Purdon 1968) (amended 1973).

110

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:83

posed a one-year durational residency requirement on aliens for
receipt of benefits under the Grants to States for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled program 6 5 (APTD). Arizona defended
its statute on the ground that Congress authorized a residency
requirement for aliens. It relied on the APTD provision directing
the Secretary not to approve any plan excluding any citizen of the
United States. 61 6 The Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation, holding that the provision did not authorize a residency requirement for aliens, but merely directed the Secretary not to
exclude citizens. 6 7 The Court also examined the legislative history
of the federal statute, and determined that there was no clear
indication of Congressional intent to authorize the imposition of a
durational residency requirement on aliens. 68 The Court stated,
however, that the citizenship provision of the APTD statute "appear[ed] to have its roots in identical language of the . . . Social
Security Act of 1935 as originally enacted.' 6 The legislative history of that Act stated that "a State may if it wishes, assist only
those who are citizens.'1 7 0 Although this statement appears to evi-

165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1950) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
166. Graham, 403 U.S. at 380. Section 1352(b) provides in pertinent part that:
The Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in
subsection (a) of this section, except that he shall not approve any plan which
imposes, as a condition of eligibility for aid to the permanently and totally disabled
under the plan(2) Any citizenship requirement which excludes any citizen of the United
States.
42 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1950) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1976)).
167. Graham, 403 U.S. at 381-82. Similarly, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1968), the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of state statutes that conditioned the
receipt of welfare benefits under the jointly-funded AFDC program on a one-year residency
requirement. Id. One of the grounds on which the states defended the restrictions was that
Congress had expressly instructed the Secretary not to approve any plan that imposed an
eligibility requirement denying aid to a resident of one year. Id. at 638-39. As in Graham, the
Supreme Court rejected the defense of implicit Congressional authorization, finding that the
federal legislation did not by its terms require one-year residency but "merely direct[ed] the
Secretary . . . not to disapprove plans submitted by the States because they include such a
requirement." Id. at 639.
168. Graham, 403 U.S. at 381.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 365 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935); S. REP. No.
628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1935)).
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dence Congress' intent to authorize a restriction on aliens, the
Court minimized its significance by observing that the eligibility
provision of the original Social Security Act was enacted prior to
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission.'7 In Takahashi, the Court
rejected the concept that a state could condition the receipt of
certain "privileges" on citizenship.1 72 The Graham Court reasoned
that the legislative history should be interpreted as expressing Con73
gress' understanding of the law as it existed prior to Takahashi.1
In light of Graham, state citizenship provisions that mandate
the exclusion of undocumented aliens can be interpreted as not
having been authorized by Congress. On its face, the citizenship
175
provision of Title XIX 174 does not authorize such a restriction,
and Congress gave no clear indication in the legislative history that
it intended to exclude undocumented aliens from eligibility. 76 Furthermore, the Graham Court determined that the APTD provision
and the original Social Security Act provision had the same origin. 1 77 Since the citizenship provision of Title XIX is identical to
these provisions, 178 it is reasonable to assume that it also had its
origin in the Social Security Act provision. Therefore, the Graham
Court's construction of the APTD provision 79 should apply to the
Medicaid citizenship provision. If state citizenship provisions are
determined to be unconstitutional insofar as they exclude undocumented children, as is suggested by Part I of this Note, 80 the
statement of Congressional intent in the original Social Security Act

171. Id. at 381 (citing Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)).
172. 334 U.S. at 420-21. The "public-interest doctrine" rejected in Takahashi allowed
states to distinguish between constitutional "rights" and "privileges" in dispensing governmental benefits, the latter of which could be made dependent on citizenship. Id.
173. 403 U.S. at 382. The Court cautioned that federal statutes should be interpreted
constitutionally whenever possible. Id. at 382-83.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
175. See supra note 38-42 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., S, REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 82; reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1943, 2023.
177. See 403 U.S. at 381.
178. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1950) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1352(b)
(1976)), 42 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1976 & Supp. V
1981)), and 42 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (1976)) with
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
179. 403 U.S. at 381. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 76-157 and accompanying text.
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should logically be read as expressing Congress' understanding of
the law as it existed prior to Plyler.
This construction of Title XIX's citizenship provision is in accordance with the traditional legal principle that "statutes should
be construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality." 8' If state citizenship provisions cannot constitutionally exclude undocumented children, the Title XIX citizenship provison
should not be construed to authorize state citizenship provisions
that exclude undocumented children.
B. The FederalRegulations
As previously discussed, the current federal regulations mandate the exclusion of undocumented aliens. 8 2 Moreover, Congress
reenacted the citizenship provision of Title XIX in substantially the
same form as the original, thus arguably showing implicit approval
of the agency's interpretation. 8 3 If the Supreme Court found that
state citizenship provisions excluding undocumented children violate the Equal Protection Clause, however, the interpretation given
to the federal statute by the Department of Health and Human
Services would require a finding that both the regulations and the
federal Medicaid statute violate the Equal Protection Clause insofar
8 4 However,
as they exclude undocumented children.1
because Congress reenacted the citizenship provision prior to the Plyler decision, 1 5 the regulations may properly be held invalid as inconsistent
86
with a constitutional interpretation of the provision.1

181. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 382-83.
182. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.183. When Congress shows its approval of an agency's interpretation by reenacting the
statute in substantially the same form after it has been interpreted by the agency entrusted
with its enforcement, courts generally import deference to the interpretation of the statute by
the agency. United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compafiia, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908)
("[T]he reenactment by Congress, without change, of a statute which had previously received
long-continued executive construction, is an adoption by Congress of such construction.").
184. See supra notes 76-157 and accompanying text.
185. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 808
(1981) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
186. There are two other applicable rules of regulatory construction, "contemporaneousness" and "long-continuedness." Note, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 398 (1941). "Contemporaneousness" refers to the judicial rule to the effect that "[iln
the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of
those who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE MEDICAID
STATUTES UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that unless a federal
statute or its legislative history clearly authorizes the exclusion of a
class of persons from a jointly-funded assistance program, a state
eligibility provision that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal standards is invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 87 In
Townsend v. Swank,'8 8 for example, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the eligibility requirement of the Illinois Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) statute."8 9 Under the Illinois
statute, dependent children eighteen to twenty years of age who
attended high school or vocational training were eligible for benefits under the program, but those who attended a college or university were not eligible.' 90 Section 406(a)(2)(B) of the Social Security
Act, however, defined "dependent child" for purposes of the AFDC

into effect, is entitled to very great respect." Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
206, 210 (1827). The original Medicaid citizenship provision was adopted in February, 1971,
36 Fed. Reg. 3872 (1971) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 248.50 (1972)), six years after the adoption
of the Medicaid statute, for the purpose of codifying prior HEW policy. See Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 8780 (1970). Although the HEW policy may have been
adopted contemporaneously with the statute, in the event that state citizenship provisions are
held unconstitutional, sustaining it would be inconsistent with a constitutional interpretation
of the statute. See supra notes 76-157 and accompanying text. In such a case, a court would
be unlikely to follow the contemporaneousness doctrine. See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S.
741, 750 (1969) (quoting Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948))
(Internal Revenue regulations promulgated contemporaneously with the Internal Revenue
Code " 'must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue
statutes [and] . . . should not be overruled except for weighty reasons.' "). The "longcontinuedness" rationale would give weight to a regulation deemed to have Congressional
approval by virtue of its long-continued use without substantial change. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938). This rationale does not seem persuasive in the present instance
because the very reason for an altered intrepretation is the Plyler holding. See 457 U.S. 202
(1982).
187. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See also Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 578
(1975); New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421-22 (1973).
If it is determined that a class of persons is eligible to receive benefits under a federal
program, all participating states must grant benefits to the class. Alcala, 420 U.S. at 589
(Marshall, J.,dissenting). If it is determined that a class is not eligible under federal
standards, federal financing would not be available for that purpose. Id.
188. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
189. Illinois Public Aid Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-1.1 (1967).
190. Id.
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program to include children under the age of twenty-one who were
also students regularly attending a school, college, university or
vocational or technical institution.' 9 ' The Supreme Court found
that the Illinois statute violated the Supremacy Clause, holding that
neither the language of the AFDC statute nor its legislative history
supported the view that Congress authorized Illinois to vary the
eligibilty requirements to exclude persons otherwise eligible who
were attending a college or university. 92 The Court noted that to
the contrary, Congress expressed the intent that aid was to be
furnished to all eligible individuals, 9 3 further indicating Congress'
intent to withhold the discretion to vary AFDC eligibility requirements from federal standards.9 4 The Court held that a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under
the federal standard violates the Supremacy Clause unless Congress
has clearly authorized the exclusion. 9 5
As has been discussed previously, if it is found that the states
cannot constitutionally exclude undocumented children from Medicaid coverage, Title XIX's citizenship provision should be interpreted as not authorizing their exclusion. 9 Moreover, the federal
Medicaid statute contains a provision instructing the states to furnish Medicaid to "all eligible individuals.' 9 7 By analogy to Townsend, state citizenship provisions that exclude undocumented children made eligible by federal standards should be held invalid
under the Supremacy Clause.
V. PREGNANT UNDOCUMENTEDALIENS
A child born in the United States of undocumented parents is a
citizen.1 98 A pregnant undocumented alien is in a unique position
191. U.S.C. § 606(a)(2)(B) (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V
1981)).
192. Townsend, 404 U.S. at 287-91. The Townsend Court relied on King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968), in support of its holding. 404 U.S. at 286. In King v. Smith, the Alabama
regulation at issue defined "parent" for purposes of the AFDC program to include an
unrelated man cohabitating with the mother of a child who was otherwise eligible, thus
defeating the child's right to benefits. 392 U.S. at 313. The Court found that the state
.lestriction denied assistance to children made eligible by the Federal program. Id. at 333.
193. Townsend, 404 U.S. at 285.
194. Id. at 286.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 158-81 and accompanying text.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(8) (1976) (emphasis added).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
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because if she is denied access to medical care because of her
undocumented status, her child, upon birth, is denied equal access
to the postpartum medical care received by citizens and documented aliens under Medicaid. 1 99 Such an inequitable result contradicts Supreme Court precedent holding that a child cannot be
penalized for the status of its parents .200 This analysis suggests that a
pregnant undocumented alien in labor should be admitted to a
hospital in the United States as a Medicaid patient for the limited
purpose of assuring that the newborn citizen's rights are protected.
Further support for admitting an undocumented alien in labor
into a hospital as a Medicaid patient can be found in the reasoning
of the Southern District of New York in Ruiz v. Blum. 20 1 In Ruiz,
the Court held that day care services under New York's AFDC
program could not be denied to a native born citizen on the ground
that his mother was an undocumented alien. 20 2 The Court held that
the child is the "primary beneficiary" of these services, despite the
fact that the mother also benefits from them .203 The Court based its
reasoning on "the simple fact that day care service 'is care .. .
which is provided to a child.' -204 Similarly, the newborn child of
an undocumented alien is arguably the primary beneficiary of medical care provided to its mother at the time of its birth. Because such
a child is a citizen at birth, it should not be denied the postpartum
care available to other citizens and documented aliens based on its
mother's undocumented status.
Whether Medicaid should pay for services to pregnant women
during the course of pregnancy is a more difficult issue because the
Supreme Court has held that an unborn child is not a "person" for
fourteenth amendment purposes. 205 Consequently, an unborn child
199. For discussion of mandatory and optional medical services, see supra notes 31, 37.
200. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770
(1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Corp., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
201. 549 F. Supp. 871, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (quoting N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, §.416.1 (1979)).
205. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). See also Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224
(D. Conn. 1972); McGarvey v. Magee-Women's Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1972);
Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972). Cf. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470
P.2d 617 (1970) (unborn fetus is not a "human being" within the meaning of homicide
statute); State v. Dickenson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971) (unborn fetus is not a
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can make no claim to equal protection under the law. 20 6 Assuming

that the undocumented mother could be constitutionally excluded
from eligibility, the unborn child would have no claim to an equal
protection violation based on discrimination against it prior to
207

birth.
However, the Supreme Court's rationale for holding that unborn children are not persons under the fourteenth amendment is
not persuasive when applied to medical care. In Roe v. Wade, the
Court indicated that it was so holding in order to avoid the difficulties that would result if a fetus were held to have due process rights

under the abortion laws. 20 8 The Court pointed to the difficulties in
statutes that permit abortion procured or attempted by medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. 20 9 If the fetus
is a person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of
law, the mother's condition could not be the sole factor in determining the legality of an abortion. 210 The same problems do not
exist with respect to statutes discriminating against unborn persons
with respect to pre-natal care. There is consequently no similar
justification for not recognizing the equal protection right of the
unborn child, at least for certain important benefits such as Medicaid.
"person" within meaning of vehicular homicide statute). But see Cheaney v. State, 259 Ind.
138, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972) (opinion affirming conviction under statute prohibiting abortion
based partly on right of the unborn child).
206. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 157-58 n.54.
209. Id.
210. Id. As the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade explains:
[N]either in Texas nor in any other State are all abortions prohibited. Despite broad
proscription, an exception always exists. The exception . . . for an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother, is typical. But if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life
without due process of law, and if the mother's condition is the sole determinant,
does not the . . . exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment's command?
There are other inconsistencies between Fourteenth Amendment status and the
typical abortion statute. [I]n Texas, the woman is not a principal or an accomplice
with respect to an abortion upon her. If the fetus is a person, why is the woman not
a principal or an accomplice? Further, the penalty for criminal abortion [in Texas]
...is significantly less than the maximum penalty for murder .... If the fetus is a
person, may the penalties be different?
Id. See also Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 228-29 (D. Conn. 1972).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Plyler extended the use of the intermediate level of scrutiny. 21' The Plyler Court applied the intermediate
test in favor of undocumented children because of their unaccountability for their illegal status. The Court also stressed the pivotal
role of the right of which they were deprived.2 1 2 The Plyler analysis
suggests that, in future cases, courts will be required either to test
all statutes that burden undocumented children under intermediate
scrutiny, or to weigh the importance of government benefits in
their determination of whether to apply the intermediate test. If the
Supreme Court follows the latter approach, it is difficult to perceive
how medical assistance, or other basic welfare benefits, can be
denied undocumented children.
Laurie McGinnis

211. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
212. Id. at 224.

